The European Union in the Trap of Its Own Climate Goals

The European Union faces a fundamental question: evolution or revolution in climate policy? Czech MEP Alexandr Vondra points out that the Green Deal, advocated by environmental radicals, is a burden for European industry and competitiveness without delivering the expected results on a global scale. Vondra emphasizes the need for a more flexible and market-oriented approach that considers the needs of regions like Central Europe, including the development of nuclear energy and the protection of key industrial sectors. What changes are necessary for Europe to respond more effectively to global climate challenges? Alexandr Vondra shares his thoughts on this matter in an interview with Stanisław Okoński.

I want to start the conversation with a question raised during a conference organized by the Jagiellonian Club – does the European Union’s climate policy require evolution or revolution?

As a conservative, I definitely prefer evolution over revolution—especially when there are no real perspectives for a revolution. The problem is that over the past five years, European institutions, particularly the Commission and Parliament, have been dominated by environmental radicals. They have been very vocal and actively advocated for their agenda. At the same time, centrist and centre-right politicians often gave in to their demands.

As a result, the Green Deal was established and adopted. Many of the decarbonization measures are very radical and extremely restrictive, even compared to the rest of the world. This let us call such an approach revolutionary. I oppose this policy, most often voting against its measures as an MEP. Unfortunately, this perspective is still represented by a minority in the European Parliament. We are outnumbered.

The main issue from our point of view is that such a revolution does not yield the desired outcomes. CO2 emissions are a global problem, not a European one. If you look at what is happening in China, India, the United States, or even Russia during the war, the EU currently accounts for just about 7% of global CO2 emissions. Historically speaking, China has already surpassed Europe in total emissions and they are barely concerned with curbing them.

The policy implemented in the EU today not only does not significantly curb global warming but also weakens our competitiveness. It is a revolution that puts Europe at a disadvantage.

So, in your view, the EU’s climate policy affects competitiveness more than it addresses global climate change?

Exactly. In 2024, we see others—like China—emitting more and more, while we emit less and less. What is the result? We are losing the remnants of our industry and ceding our competitive edge to Asia and even the United States. So far, this approach has brought no positive effects.

Has the EU’s approach to climate policy changed after the June elections?

Yes. During last year’s election campaign, there was clear public opposition to the Green Deal, particularly among farmers. Farmers were more organized in their protests compared to, for example, workers in the energy sector.

As a result, the new composition of the European Parliament is better—at least from my perspective. The Greens are weaker, and the Socialists have also lost ground. Both groups are relatively similar since the Socialists essentially acted like the Greens, trying to achieve their social-democratic goals through climate policy.

How do you assess the current balance of power in the Parliament?

The Parliament is now slightly better—not significantly, but there has been a shift toward more rational and less revolutionary approaches. Over the past weeks, we have seen this several times. For example, we managed to postpone the deforestation regulation since it was poorly prepared.

However, the Commission remains a problem. It is full of bureaucrats who have held their positions for years. The rationale behind selecting members of the new Commission did not reflect the changing attitudes within the EU. There are some areas where there is an improvement compared to the previous Commission, such as foreign and defence affairs. For instance, Kaja Kallas from Estonia is significantly better than Josep Borrell, whose tenure as a commissioner was a disaster. However, people dealing with the Green Deal—like Vice-President Teresa Ribera or Commissioner Kadri Simson for Energy—still seem to remain attracted to this harmful dream.

Their rhetoric during hearings remains unchanged, and while they mention industrial policy, it sounds superficial and unconvincing. Currently, we are trying to repair previous legislation and save the automotive industry, which is losing competitiveness in the global market, even though it has been a pride of the European economy for decades. The Commission is still barely responsive to signals coming from the private sector. For the situation to improve in any way, member states in the Council will have to put much more pressure on the Commission than they have so far.

Do you think achieving climate neutrality by 2050 is still realistic, considering the approach of the United States after the recent presidential elections?

I would break this question into two parts. First, is the goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 realistic? Honestly, I do not know, so I would like to refer to the famous saying by John Maynard Keynes: “In the long run, we are all dead”. For politicians, it is easy to make commitments for a distant future, like the year 2050.

It is easy for politicians to set distant goals, but they are judged by what they achieve within the next 4-8 years. What will happen in 20 or 30 years? Who knows? I would not entirely dismiss the goals for 2050, but I am against setting new targets for 2040 when we do not even know if we can meet the targets for 2030. For example, Germany, Europe’s strongest economy, is currently not on track to meet its own 2030 goals. That’s the reality.

The second part of this issue is probably how Europe should react if the U.S. withdraws from the Paris Agreement and limits funding for climate action.

This is absolutely crucial. I raised this issue during the hearings of EU commissioners: “What is your Plan B if, in January or February, the newly elected U.S. president announces withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and stops funding global climate actions?” Or, even worse, what if the U.S. changes legislation, such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), and aims to further economically subordinate Europe to its interests?

The U.S. strategy helps them achieve economic success—it is not like the European one, which seems to be a suicidal mission. I was shocked when key commissioners, like Teresa Ribera or Frans Timmermans, admitted they had no Plan B for such a turn of events. They are completely unprepared.

This lack of preparation is alarming. Without a contingency plan, we might find ourselves in a situation where Europe becomes isolated, continuing its idealistic efforts, while the rest of the world pursues its own interests. Europe will not succeed if it continues to just pose as a beacon—the world does not work like that anymore. We no longer live in the 19th century, when Europe could impose its conditions on the rest of the world. Now, countries like China, India, or Brazil are steadfastly pursuing their own interests, based on different principles.

What changes would you make to the EU’s climate policy if you were the climate commissioner? Should the Green Deal be scrapped?

First of all, I would never want to be a commissioner. I received offers in Prague to run for such a position, but I always declined. I grew up in the Czech anti-communist movement and value freedom too highly to engage in political promises and compromises that are commonplace in Brussels.

However, if I were in a decision-making position, I would advocate for a much more flexible and market-oriented approach. For example, excessive regulation of industries should stop. Take the automotive industry—critical for the Czech Republic, accounting for about 10% of GDP and 15% of jobs. Meanwhile, EU legislation mandates the end of internal combustion engine production by 2035 and requires the shift to 100% electromobility.

This is an utterly unsustainable nonsense. Many CEOs of automotive companies privately agree with me, but they cannot say so publicly, due to the pressure of ESG regulations and fear of losing access to financing. If we continue down this path, Europe risks losing its competitiveness in another major market, just as it happened with European smartphone manufacturers like Ericsson and Nokia.

By excessively pushing for electromobility, we are giving up our competitive edge in internal combustion engine production—a field where European engineers excel. Electromobility relies on batteries and software, which are the areas already dominated by China, owing to its access to cheaper raw materials and energy.

How do you see the EU’s approach to electromobility? What are the implications of promoting this technology for the automotive sector?

Many mistakes have been made in the context of electromobility. It was supposed to be the key to European innovation, meanwhile it is China that benefits the most from the production of electric cars. Instead of focusing on research and innovation to level the competitive playing field or secure the continuity of internal combustion engine production, Europe has practically ceded this market to China. As a result, people are now buying Chinese or Tesla cars, while Europe is raising taxes, making everything more expensive. Some politicians are even dreaming about eliminating cars altogether, which is completely unrealistic – no need to explain it further.

We need a clear correction of the course we have taken as the EU. For instance, the ETS 2 system increases the costs of heating and transportation—which are both basic human needs. Everyone needs to commute, heat their homes in winter, and have access to hot water. The current approach is deeply flawed.

We must adopt a policy that creates basic frameworks but allows companies to compete. Regulations should be technologically neutral. For example, nuclear energy remains unfairly discriminated against compared to solar and wind energy, even though it is stable, whereas wind and solar are not. We see this especially in winter when prices fluctuate drastically and are sometimes extraordinarily high.

What are the main challenges related to the energy transition in the Czech Republic? How does this topic resonate with public opinion?

The Czech Republic has minimal potential for wind and solar energy due to geographical limitations. Relying on energy imports from Germany—considering their enormous energy problems—is not a solution. This dependence undermines energy independence. Nuclear energy is crucial for us, and its discrimination in the EU has to end.

While we have made progress in the EU’s green taxonomy by ensuring that nuclear energy is no longer classified as harmful, the system remains unfair. Czech and French taxpayers still subsidize wind and solar projects in countries like Spain and Germany, which refuse to implement nuclear energy. At the same time, we must finance our nuclear projects with minimal external support. This creates an uneven playing field and is fundamentally wrong.

Do you see opportunities for regional cooperation in the energy sector, particularly considering Poland’s emphasis on nuclear energy?

I am definitely in favour of cooperation in Central Europe. I was one of the founding fathers of the Visegrad Group in the early 1990s as a young man. Unfortunately, today this format is stifled by the policies of Hungary and Slovakia regarding Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since they are playing on anti-Ukrainian sentiments and neglecting the security aspect, they are creating challenges for the Czech Republic and other countries in the region.

The war itself also influences the energy transition in Europe. A clear example is Germany’s recent dependency on gas imports from Russia, which negatively impacted all of us. Once these issues are resolved and differences alleviated, I believe we will be able to cooperate again, as we have achieved successes in the past, including in energy and environmental policies.

This article was created in collaboration with the Poland with Nature Foundation, a member of the Our Common Home network, as part of the project organizing the conference Energy Security in Central and Eastern Europe 2024. Green Conservatism’s Role in Building a More Competitive EU. The event report is available here.