’Community of Shared Destiny for All Mankind’ – this is China’s blueprint for a new world order
The idea of a 'Community of Shared Destiny for All Mankind’ is one of the pillars of Xi Jinping’s diplomacy – a new, more ambitious version of China’s international policy. Behind the new policy is not only an idea but also concrete projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. In Europe, under this new vision, the role of Hungary, Serbia and Belarus comes to the fore. How is the cooperation between these countries and China shaping up? What are the risks involved? Stanislaw Kopyta discusses these issues with Dr Una Berzina-Cerenkova.
The 'All-Weather Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, announced by the Hungarian and Chinese governments in May this year, elevates Hungary to the status of a Chinese strategic partner. One cannot help but notice that this title was previously reserved exclusively for the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) closest partners, such as the Russian Federation. How is it possible that a country with a population comparable to that of a medium-sized city in China is so important?
China appreciates those countries that support its global and regional narrative, and this is what Viktor Orban is doing, additionally using it for his own political games. Hungary, along with Serbia, has become a 'star’ of the 16+1 format, and more importantly, it is a European country that remains a member of the EU and NATO, but at the same time supports Xi Jinping’s 'Community of Shared Destiny for All Mankind’ narrative.
Moreover, the Hungarian government sees the world in a similar way to the Chinese leader. ‘Community of Shared Destiny for All Mankind’ is an alternative Chinese vision of the global order. Officially, it preaches respect for the local political systems and the amplification of the voice of the countries of the Global South. It serves to increase Chinese influence in the world, relying primarily on alternative international organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, with the main aim of counterbalancing US influence.
In Chinese domestic discourse, Hungary is usually portrayed as a central European country with a magnificent city, Budapest, as I have had the opportunity to explore studying the case of television programmes produced in Hungary by Chinese television stars. There, it is emphasised with pride that this is the kind of country that supports China, which is a manoeuvre to show Chinese citizens that Xi Jinping’s policies have the support of at least part of the Western public. Moreover, it is useful for the narrative for the Global South.
From the Chinese point of view, Hungary is an integral part of the West, which is very important from a symbolic point of view. There is also an economic aspect, consisting primarily of Chinese companies benefiting from their presence in the European market. It is crucial, especially in view of the intensifying competition in the electric vehicles market, in which Hungary is siding with China. Also, the developed Hungarian automotive industry certainly suits Chinese needs, but from a purely economic point of view, these reasons are not sufficient to explain the establishment of such deep cooperation from a Chinese perspective. The explanation, in my opinion, is this symbolic aspect, which from the Chinese perspective is just as important as the economic issues.
Before going to Hungary, Xi Jinping started his European tour this year with a visit to Serbia. Why does the Chinese leader attach such importance to this country? After all, the entire Western Balkans is a very small market, with only about 18 million consumers and worth less than 1% of the EU’s GDP.
Here, symbolic aspects also come to the fore. Serbia and China share a specific historical experience – during the bombing of Belgrade in 1999, NATO forces mistakenly attacked the Chinese embassy in the city. Three people were killed in the raid at the Chinese facility, and the embassy site is now home to the Chinese Cultural Centre. In addition, some of the first European films to reach China were of Yugoslavian production, making them indelibly etched in the fond memory of Chinese society.
As in the case of Hungary, the fact that Serbia belongs to the circle of European countries is also important. This is especially true given that in its view China systematically emphasises that in its view, the division of Europe into the European Union and non-European countries is artificial and inappropriate; they see Europe as unity, regardless of the opinion of the European elite.
The Chinese authorities behaved in the same way with regard to the 16+1 format, in which they included the Western Balkans and excluded Kosovo. For domestic audiences and those in the Global South, Serbia thus serves both as an example of an ally and as proof that 'China does not bow to the West’, does not go to Brussels or Paris first, but listens to both sides.
A similar pattern could also be seen in other global endeavours of Chinese diplomacy, such as the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation or the Russian-Ukrainian war. The Chinese want to show that they are listening to both sides and are above the European divide. It is because China is simply an opportunistic state. The further they move away from their borders, the less risk they are willing to take. Their increased presence in the Western Balkans is primarily due to the fact that they are welcome there.
On the other hand, symbolism is not everything. From a geopolitical point of view, Serbia is a force against NATO, which is of course welcomed by China, as the number one goal of the PRC is to reduce the pressure exerted on it by the US around the world. Also in economic terms, Serbia is a good partner, as the interests of both countries largely overlap. Moreover, it is easier for China to work with a hybrid regime that is not as transparent as a democracy, with the opposition and civil society unable to stop or oversee individual political and economic projects.
In 2022, a journalistic investigation revealed the activities of Chinese foreign police stations in Hungary. Their purpose is to supervise and control the Chinese diaspora. The operation of similar outposts was also revealed on Serbian territory. At the same time, Chinese Security Minister Wang Xiaohong proposed to Hungary to establish security and counter-terrorism cooperation. To what extent does the Hungarian-Chinese rapprochement in the field of security and information exchange pose a threat to the European Union and NATO?
The role of these foreign police stations is oversimplified in the European narrative. On one hand, we know that they provide services identical to those offered by Chinese consulates and embassies, such as passport renewal. At the same time, according to official statements, these posts are responsible for prosecuting Chinese citizens who have committed crimes in China.
Many posts do not act as a physical police presence. I have seen pictures of Chinese nationals connecting from Europe for questioning with a Chinese judge connecting from China. There have also been reported cases of physical police presence, for example, Chinese police officers patrolling some historical sites in Italy for the official purpose of keeping an eye on Chinese tourists.
The narrative in the European media simplifies the real problems arising from these posts. The threat is not Chinese police surveillance of European citizens, but counterintelligence issues. However, it should be pointed out again: in themselves, these outposts are not a good cover for the activities of Chinese spies. Being an intelligence agent working in this type of post, you can be sure that your cover will be blown even before you arrive.
The problem is that in a country as friendly to China as Hungary, the control of Chinese outposts in terms of counterintelligence threats can be weakened, and it is this aspect that is at the heart of the threat emanating from the existence of these outposts. This is exacerbated by the fact that the Chinese Ministry of Security is known for launching cyber-attacks, for which such poorly supervised outposts in Hungary or Serbia could be an ideal base.
Another important country in terms of China’s influence in CEE is Belarus: from 2013 to 2023, Alexander Lukashenko and Xi Jinping met 13 times. The country unequivocally supports China on the international stage, while China is equally vocal in its condemnation of Western sanctions imposed on Belarus. Belarus is also an observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and, according to some, could become a full member later this year. Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Belarus has also become an intermediary in the trade of 'dual-use goods’ between China and Russia. Why is Belarus important from China’s point of view and what does the country gain from deepening cooperation?
Belarus fits well into the symbolic constellation we discussed in the case of Hungary and Serbia. For China, the internal ideology of allies is not important, as long as they are useful in opposing US influence. Lukashenko’s son recites poems in Chinese, and Lukashenko is very proud of this because for him the relationship with China is very important. It is the only way to at least slightly counter Russian influence. Especially as Belarus’s dependence on Russia further increased after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
At the same time, there was a situation when Lukashenko left the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit meeting too early, which in turn did not please Xi Jinping. There is a certain role that China expects Belarus to fulfil and, as with other countries, it largely boils down to performing in the symbolic sphere. When Lukashenko showed disrespect by not attending the entire summit, China noticed it.
On the other hand, China is well aware of the close relationship between Belarus and Russia; Belarus is therefore valuable for its knowledge of Russia. Due to strategic considerations, Belarus may be interested in passing on some intelligence information to China from time to time in order to counterbalance Russia’s significant control over the country.
In addition, economic cooperation is also important, although since the Russian invasion of Ukraine the Belt and Road initiative is almost dead, and even in better times for cooperation there have been some problems, such as corruption scandals. Nevertheless, it is easier for China to export goods to Belarus, as exports to that country are subject to fewer regulations than it is to send goods to the European Union. I imagine that Belarus might, for example, be willing to accept some of the waste generated during the production process of electric vehicles.
You mention good relations with Hungary, Belarus and Serbia, but on the other hand, Lithuania left the Chinese 16+1 format in 2021 and Latvia and Estonia in 2022. Why did the 16+1 format and rapprochement with China prove unattractive for the Baltic States?
In the case of Lithuania, it had to do with Lithuanian foreign policy. The decision was triggered by China’s actions in Lithuania, for example, the protest organised by Chinese diplomats in response to the demonstrations of support organised in favour of Hong Kong. Lithuania’s decision was thus the result of strong dissatisfaction with the actions taken by the PRC.
The same was true of Estonia and Latvia, which motivated their decisions by opposition to China’s ambivalent stance towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Leaving the format on the same day, the governments of both countries published very similar statements that said they would no longer participate in the format, but saw the prospect of cooperation with China. From now on, cooperation is to take shape either bilaterally or in the 27+1 format – that is, within the European Union.
China used to regard Ukraine as a very important part of the Belt and Road project. How has this perception changed after the 24th of February 2022? How is the direct relationship between Kyiv and Beijing shaping up?
The Belt and Road has diminished as a project, to the extent that it is often ironically referred to as 'small and beautiful’, and its reach is now limited to China’s immediate neighbourhood, mainly Southeast Asia. As far as Europe is concerned, the project in its original form has died out, just as European interest in pursuing it has diminished.
China is now focusing on the so-called Central Corridor, running through Central Asia and the South Caucasus. They are looking for alternative routes, bypassing Russia, but at the same time, they realise that Europe is no longer as committed as it once was to joint initiatives with China.
Coming back to Sino-Ukrainian relations: before the war, relations between the two countries were flourishing. Ukraine remembers that China, despite good relations with Russia, did not recognise the annexation of Crimea in 2014, so at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian authorities hoped that China would at least not give Russia significant support. However, Chinese actions in the subsequent years of the war led to a slow change in Ukrainian attitudes towards the PRC.
At this year’s Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, President Zelenski directly criticised China for its stance on the war, stating that it is not helpful to the peace process. To date, President Zelenski has claimed that Ukraine is open to cooperation with everyone, even after China published its 12-point Peace Plan. A few of these points may have corresponded to Ukrainian interests, but overall the plan was unhelpful and unclear.
Moreover, as far as we can see, despite Chinese assurances of neutrality, there is a great asymmetry in the number of bilateral meetings. On the one hand, Xi Jinping will meet with Putin on a fairly regular basis; on the other hand, there have been only a few telephone conversations between Chinese and Ukrainian officials. Because of this, there is now a growing realisation in Ukraine that China will not provide significant assistance to the country, as it is in a position to sacrifice the relationship for a greater goal. This approach may therefore serve as a warning to Belarus, Serbia and Hungary: their relationship with China may also be sacrificed overnight once it is no longer politically viable for Beijing to continue.
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Stanisław Kopyta
Una Bērziņa-Čerenkova